The Bold Card: Why Turkey Should Extend Its Hand to Greece

Furkan Bayoglu
Co-Founding Partner, Sevent Group | Commercial Real Estate Investor and Analyst

I have spent more than thirty years in Turkey's commercial real estate sector. The most fundamental lesson this profession has taught me is this: the most expensive thing in the world is energy spent on a struggle that cannot be won.

When I look at the relationship between Turkey and Greece, that is precisely what I see.

The Numbers Don't Lie

In 2025, Turkey spent $30 billion on defense. Greece spent $8.4 billion — equivalent to 3% of its GDP, placing it among NATO's highest spenders relative to economic output. Two NATO allies consumed well over $38 billion combined — largely in postures directed at each other.

Write that down.

Now write this: Turkey's defense exports reached $8.5 billion in 2025. Turkey now exports more in defense products in a single year than Greece spends on its entire military budget. ASELSAN ranks 47th among the world's largest defense companies. The KAAN fighter aircraft is flying. Bayraktar is no longer just a brand — it is a geopolitical argument.

Turkey has already won this contest. Technologically, industrially, in terms of production capacity — Greece cannot sustain this race. Allocating 3% of GDP to defense is an unsustainable economic burden for Greece, and the primary reason for that burden is Turkey.

We Have Not Stepped Back. We Will Not.

Let us be clear about this first.

On the Aegean airspace disputes, on territorial waters, on the continental shelf — Turkey's position has not changed. On Cyprus, Turkey's principles remain where they have always been. There is no concession here, and there will not be.

But an outstretched hand from a position of strength is not a concession. On the contrary — an outstretched hand from strength is the most mature expression of strategic superiority. The party that sets the framework, that builds the table, is invariably the stronger party. Turkey is that party today.

A Shared Legacy: Builders, Not Enemies

Beneath the Greek-Turkish tension lies a historical wound: the narrative of "Ottoman oppression." But let us read that history once more, more carefully.

At the height of the Ottoman Empire, the Divan-i Humayun — the imperial council — was overwhelmingly composed of devshirme officials of Albanian, Greek, Bosnian, and Serbian origin. Ibrahim Pasha was Greek. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was Bosnian. Koca Sinan Pasha was Albanian. To read the Ottoman Empire as a purely "Turkish state" is a serious historical oversimplification.

The Phanariots: Architects of Ottoman Diplomacy

The Greek community was not merely "one subject people among many." The Phanariots — the elite Greek families of the Fener district in Istanbul — were the Ottoman Empire's gateway to the West. They governed Wallachia and Moldavia. They served as chief dragomans of the Sublime Porte, functionally acting as foreign ministers. Ottoman diplomacy was substantially built by Greek intellect.

Mehmed II Did Not Destroy Byzantium — He Inherited It

After taking Constantinople, Mehmed II assumed the title "Kayser-i Rum" — Caesar of Rome. He declared himself heir to Byzantium, not its destroyer. He placed the Greek Patriarchate under imperial protection and preserved the Greek millet as an autonomous community.

The Ottoman Empire did not destroy Byzantium. It merged with it. It inherited the Eastern Roman tradition and made Istanbul a shared capital.

Give Greek Politicians Something to Work With

What happens if Turkey makes the following offer?

"Let us produce defense technology together. Let us combine Turkey's expertise in unmanned systems and maritime surveillance with Greece's defense industry infrastructure. Let Greece be secure not by fearing us, but by building with us."

A Greek politician translates this as: "We redirected billions from the defense budget into education, healthcare, and development — because we built our real security through cooperation with our neighbor."

Three Concrete Proposals

1. Aegean Joint Resource Framework

A joint hydrocarbon exploration and revenue-sharing regime can be constructed without resolving sovereignty disputes.

2. Aegean Security Protocol within NATO

A joint air-maritime surveillance system covering migration flows, energy security, and maritime traffic.

3. Defense Technology Partnership

A joint production agreement in unmanned systems, anti-submarine technologies, and early warning systems.

Conclusion: Whoever Builds the Table Writes the Rules

Turkey can make this offer. It should.

This offer is neither an admission of weakness nor a concession. This offer — made while the full balance of power remains intact, while all positions stand firm — will be a hand extended from strength.

Whoever builds the table writes the rules. Turkey can build that table. And it should.